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Abstract. This paper studies the dynamic behavior of inflation and unemploy-
ment in Spain during the period 1964–1997. In particular, we analyze the impli-
cations of high persistence in both unemployment and inflation dynamics for
inference regarding the size of Phillips trade-offs and sacrifice ratios in the
Spanish economy, in response to a demand shock. To do so we use a Stuctural
VAR approach with several identification outlines which give rise to alterna-
tive interpretations of the joint unemployment-inflation dynamics. When using
a bivariate VAR we cannot reject the existence of a permanent output loss of
one-half of one percentage point for each percentage point of permanent disin-
flation. However, when the VAR is augmented with a third variable, in order to
disentangle monetary from non-monetary shocks within the demand class, the
evidence favours a lower and marginally permanent trade-off with an output loss
of about one-fourth of one percentage point.
JEL classification: E12, E13, E24, C32
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1 Introduction
The Spanish annual rate of (CPI) inflation came down from 24.6% in 1977 to
about 2% in 1997, at the time when this paper was written (see Fig. 1). However,
the big blot is still unemployment, nowadays slightly down at just under 16%
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Maravall, Jose Vin˜als, two anonymous referees and seminar participants at the Banco de Espan˜a,
ESEM 98 (Berlin), and the CEPR Conference on “New Approaches to the Study of Business Cycle
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(the largest among OECD countries). From 1977 to 1989, the unemployment rate
jumped from 5.1% to 17.2%. Throughout the 1990s it has averaged 20.4% with a
maximum of 24.6% in the first quarter of 1994. The fact that the unemployment
rate was in 1997 close to what the inflation rate was in 1977 and, conversely,
that the inflation rate is only slightly below the unemployment rate in the mid-
1970s may look at first sight as if the unemployment-inflation trade-off over the
sample period was close to 1:1. This impression, however, may be deceptive
since both variables respond to demand and supply shocks while, in principle,
only the former shocks give rise to a genuine trade-off. In this paper we tackle
this issue in greater depth.
Fig. 1. Inflation and unemployment in Spain
Disentangling the trade-offs implied by those figures is a key issue for judg-
ing the performance of the Spanish economy over the last two decades. In this
respect, it is noteworthy that several alternative interpretations are compatible
with the observed inflation-unemployment correlations. So, e.g., one possible in-
terpretation of the aforesaid episodes could be a keynesian one under which,
contractionary aggregate demand policies are a major cause of the high unem-
ployment rate which, in turn, leads later to a fall in inflation and eventually to
an output recovery. However, in the presence of important hysteretic mecha-
nisms, the trade-off between unemployment and inflation could be a permanent
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one1. Other alternative interpretations, which do not allow for long-run trade-offs,
could be related, on the one hand, to the important role played by expectations
and credibility-related phenomena (neoclassical-monetarist-rational expectations
models) and, on the other hand, to the predominant role played by structural
supply-side shocks (real business cycle models); allowing for the latter may
even imply the absence of long-run and even short-run trade-offs (see Sargent
1982).
Naturally, these alternative views imply: (i) different roles for the economic
shocks leading the sources of business cycle fluctuations and stochastic growth;
(ii) different roles for the propagation mechanisms of those shocks; and, (iii) dras-
tic differences for economic policy design. These simple and well-known ideas
pose difficulties for the researcher when trying to identify the demand/supply
shocks within the bivariate system formed by inflation and unemployment. This
is so since alternative identification outlines, corresponding to each of these
views, will give rise to the same reduced form, explaining equally well the ob-
served set of dynamic correlations between both variables. Thus, we need some
method to distinghish among them.
In this paper we deal with those issues through the analysis of the joint
dynamic behaviour of inflation and unemployment in Spain over the period 1964–
1997. Our approach will consist of modelling a Vector Autoregression (VAR) in
both variables, conditioning on other exogenous variables, and imposing several
identifying restrictions on the VAR innovations in order to recover demand and
supply shocks. After all, the idea behind both the unemployment-inflation trade-
off and the sacrifice ratio is to analyse the dynamic responses of both variables
to a demand shock. Hence the importance of distinguishing between both types
of shock.
Specifically, our approach will be based upon the Structural Vector Autore-
gression (SVAR) methodology, following an earlier paper by King and Watson
(1994). We do this for two reasons. First, because until the beginning of the
1990s, most of the research on the unemployment-inflation trade-off was based
upon the estimation of quasi-structural equations relating wage/price-inflation and
the unemployment rate, i.e., the so-called Phillips curve approach (see, e.g., Gor-
don 1970) where many of the relevant variables were treated as exogenous and
where dubious identification restrictions and measurement problems abounded
(see Manning 1993). And, secondly, because it allows us to gauge how robust
some of the results obtained with the previous approach are, under the compet-
ing SVAR methodology. Furthermore, as above mentioned, by using the SVAR
methodology to map reduced form innovations onto shocks, we will be able to
pose a well defined question, namely, What effects will demand shocks have on
the levels of inflation and unemployment? and, therefore, What trade-offs and
sacrifice ratios are implied?
1 Hysteresis in Spain is related to the existence of high firing costs and long unemployment benefit
duration See, e g , Bentolila and Dolado (1994), Dolado and Lo´pez-Salido (1996) and Dolado and
Jimeno (1997)
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Following King and Watson (1994) we choose three identification outlines
which share the same reduced form. Yet, as mentioned earlier, they have sub-
stantialy different implications for the trade-off between unemployment and in-
flation, and for the interpretation of particular historical episodes. These outlines
are tentatively labeled as: i) real business-cycle, ii) monetarist, and iii) keynesian,
respectively. Given that the three identification outlines fit the data equally well,
some information outside the model will be needed in order to choose a preferred
outline among the three available possibilities.
At this stage, it is important to remark that we introduce several modifications
to the King and Watson (1994)’ methodology. First, we add some exogenous
variables supposedly capturing some further supply shocks stemming from the
“small open” economy nature of Spain. Secondly, we modify their “keynesian”
and “monetarist” identification strategies by choosing outlines in which the short-
run impact of demand shocks on unemployment is maximized, under the first
case, and where inflation is completely dominated by demand shocks in the
long-run, under the second case. We believe that both modifications lead to
neater interpretations of the underlying conceptual outlines. Thirdly, we use prior
information related to the nature of the shocks in various significant historical
episodes during the sample period to select a single identification outline out of
the three available ones. And finally, we check the robustness of the results in the
bivariate SVAR by adding a third variable to the VAR which enables to separate
monetary from fiscal shocks within the demand class of shocks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We begin in Sect. 2 by dis-
cussing the identification issues related to a bivariate VAR of inflation and un-
employment and the possible identification outlines considered in the paper. In
Sect. 3, we discuss the properties of the data and report the empirical results.
In Sect. 4, we consider the stability of our estimates across different subperi-
ods and the plausibility of the different outlines in explaining various significant
disinflationary episodes in the recent history of Spain. In Sect. 5, we address
the robustness of some key parameter estimates to changes in the identifying
restrictions. Finally, in Sect. 6, some conclusions are drawn.
2 Economic and econometric issues
2.1 Structural VAR representation and the identification problem
Let us assume that the Phillips curve takes the following structural representation:
∆ut = λ∆πt +
p∑
j =1
αuπ,j∆πt−j +
p∑
j =1
αuu,j∆ut−j + εst (1)
where λ indicates the contemporaneous effect of changes in the inflation rate
(∆π) on the unemployment rate changes (∆A), and εst is an i.i.d. structural
shock with zero mean and variance σ21, which will be defined below.
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This expression is not the usual one found in the empirical analysis of the
Phillips curve. The differences can be stated as follows. First, unemployment
appears in the LHS on (1) rather than in the RHS and the opposite happens with
inflation; the reason is that, following King and Watson (1994), we define the
Phillips trade-off as the ratio of the change in unemployment rate to the change in
inflation rate, i.e. (∂u/∂π). This is the inverse of the traditional measure (∂π/∂u ,
see, e.g. Gordon, 1990, and the references therein), and will be useful in the pre-
vious form because the hypothesis of absence of trade-off corresponds to a zero
value for the former expression, instead of −∞ as the latter one. Secondly, we
express the relationship in first differences, rather than in levels, accounting for
the importance of both hysteresis mechanisms in the unemployment rate and high
persistence in the inflation rate. Both stochastic properties are well documented
elsewhere and can be taken as “stylized facts” of the Spanish economy over the
sample period used in this paper2.
In order to close the model, we next consider the demand side of the economy,
represented through the following equation:
∆πt = δ∆ut +
p∑
j =1
αππ,j∆πt−j +
p∑
j =1
απu,j∆ut−j + εdt (2)
where the parameter δ reflects the contemporaneous effect of changes in unem-
ployment on the inflation changes, and εdt is another i.i.d. structural shock with
zero mean and variance σ22 which again is yet to be defined.
Whether the system (1)–(2) is an adequate representation of the supply and
demand sides of the economy is a debatable issue. To shed some light on our
chosen interpretation, we first summarize the key points somehow heuristically;
and, next, we will proceed to formalize those ideas, rearranging (1) and (2) in a
more familiar SVAR context.
Let us start by interpreting Eq. (1). It can be obtained from standard price-
setting and a wage-setting equations given by
P = A−1(1 + µ)W (3)
W = PeAF (u, u−1, z ) (4)
where P = price level, W = nominal wage, Pe = expected price level; µ =
price-cost mark-up, z = wage pressure (aggregate supply) variables, A = produc-
tivity. Equation (3) corresponds to non-competitive price setting under a constant-
return-to- scale production function and (4) is the typical wage-setting relation
underlying many theories of wage determination, where the presence of u−1 al-
lows for hysteretic mechanisms3. Substituting (4) in to (3), and log-linearizing
yields
π = πe + µ + z − ξ1u + ξ2u−1 (5)
2 See, for instance, Dolado and Lo´pez-Salido (1996) and Andre´s (1991) where a battery of unit
root tests cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in both series
3 See, e g , Layard et al (1991) for a good review of hysteresis models
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Next, we assume that πet = πt−1, as in the NAIRU literature; that there is
full hysteresis, so that ξ1u − ξ2u−1 is proportional to ∆u; that the markup µ is
constant; and that z is a process governed by the innovation εs . Then, inverting
Eq. (5) with u as the dependent variable yields an equation similar to (1).
As regards Eq. (2), the easiest way to interpret it is as an aggregate demand
equation where output growth (∆y) is just a function of the acceleration of real
money balances4. Using Okun’s law to convert ∆y into ∆u , and assuming that
the innovation to ∆2m is εd , yields an equation that, when inverted, looks like
(2).
As is a standard practice in the literature on SVAR (see Blanchard and Quah,
1989), it is assumed that εd and εs are orthogonal processes. Thus, the system
formed by (1) and (2) is not identified unless one further restriction is imposed.
To deal more formally with the identification problem, we use the stacked SVAR
form5:
α(L)Xt = µ + εt (6)
α(L) =
p∑
j =0
αj LJ ; Xt = (∆ut , ∆πt )′ ;
εt = (εδt , εdt )′ ; E (εtε′t ) =
∑
= [σij ] i , j = 1, 2 ;
where µ is a vector of deterministic terms, and:
α0 =
(
1 −λ
−δ 1
)
; αj =
(
αuuj αuπj
απuj αππj
)
j = 1, . . . , p
As noted earlier, we interpret Eq. (1) as the Phillips curve. Correspondingly,
the structural disturbance εst in expression (1) corresponds to a supply shock.
Conversely, the structural error term εdt in (2) is interpreted as a demand shock.
We will assume that shocks are mutually uncorrelated, σ12 = 0, so that any
contemporaneous correlation between πt and ut arises from nonzero values of
the parameters λ and δ. This simple analytical framework will allow us to address
a number of relevant issues:
(i) the estimation of the short- and long-run effects of both demand and supply
shocks on unemployment and inflation, since the specification in first differences
implies that the shocks have potentially long-lasting effects.
(ii) the estimation of the Phillips curve trade-off (PTO, henceforth), namely, the
inverse of the slope of the Phillips Curve. This concept traces out the relative
dynamic effects of demand shocks on unemployment and inflation. Formally, it
can be computed as the following long-term derivative:
PTOk =
∂ut+k/∂ε
d
t
∂πt+k/∂ε
d
t
; k = 0, 1, . . . ,∞ (7)
4 The possibility of extending this set of arguments is discussed in Sect 5
5 Notice that we write down the model in first differences, so that both ut and πt are assumed to
1(1) and not cointegrated See Sect 3 for further details
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(iii) tests for both long and short-run neutrality; i.e., the verticality of the short
and long-run Phillips curve. These hypotheses hold when expression 7 is zero
for k = 0 and k →∞, respectively.
From the previous discussion, it is clear that the structural model given by
the SVAR System in (6) is not identified. To see this consider the equivalent
reduced form VAR derived from the model6:
∆ut = a(L)∆ut−1 + b(L)∆πt−1 + eut (8a)
∆πt = c(L)∆ut−1 + d (L)∆πt−1 + eπt (8b)
which in stacked form can be written as:
Γ (L)Xt = et (9)
where et = (eut eπt )′ is a vector of zero-mean identically distributed innovations;
Γ (L) = I −Γ1L−Γ2L2− . . .−ΓpLp is an autorregressive polynomial lag matrix
with all its roots outside the unit circle; and, E (et , e′t ) = Ω = [ωij ] is the variance-
covariance matrix of the reduced form residuals.
Comparing (6) and (9), the following relationships hold: Γi = −α−10 αi , and
et = α
−1
0 εt . Thus, the matrices αi and the variance covariance matrix of the
structural shocks, Σ, are determined by the following set of equations:
−α−10 αi = Γi , i = 1, . . . , p (10)
α−10
∑
(α−10 )′ = Ω (11)
The identification problem can be stated as follows. The first set of equations
linking the variance of et and εt imposes no restrictions on α0. That is, there
are no restrictions on the coefficients on lags entering the dynamic system (6).
Thus, Eq. (11) determines the unknowns in both α0 and Σ as a function of the
variance-covariance matrix of the reduced form innovations. Yet, since Ω is a
2× 2 symmetric matrix, only three unknown parameters can be identified in α0
and Σ. Hence, even after assuming that σ12 = 0, the four parameters σ11, σ22, λ
and δ cannot be separately identified, and one additional restriction is required.
Nevertheless, by adding whatever single restriction one should wish, all the
resulting models are just-identified and, hence, their unrestricted reduced forms
fit the data equally well. Notwithstanding, each one will have different implica-
tions for disentangling: i) the sources of business cycle fluctuations and stochastic
trends; ii) the trade-off between unemployment and inflation; and, iii) the pol-
icy interpretations of particular historical episodes. In this respect, the following
section explores three alternative identifying restrictions which seem to us espe-
cially meaningful from an economic point of view. The three schemes share the
orthogonality assumption, σ12 = 0, and none of them imposes long-run verticality
of the Phillips curve, since this is one of the propositions we wish to test.
6 Notice that, for the sake of simplicity, deterministic terms have been omitted from the equations
7
2.2 Three alternative identification schemes
A simple comparison of expressions (6) and (9) implies that the innovations of
the reduced form, eut and eπt , can be expressed as linear combinations of the
structural shocks. In particular, simple derivations lead to: eut = D(λεdt + εst ) and
eπt = D(εdt + δεst ), with D = (1− λδ)−1.
Using these relationships and the VAR reduced form (expressions (8a) and
(8b)) a closed-form solution for the long-run PT0 (expression (7)) can be
calculated7:
lim
k→∞
PT 0k =
(1− d (1))λ + b(1)
(1− a(1)) + λc(1) (12)
Thus, the long-run PTOk is a function of the short-run PTOk (λ) and the
long-run relationships (gains) between unemployment and inflation (the lag-
polynomials of the reduced form VAR evaluated at L=l). Notice also that if
c(1) < 0, the long-run PTOk does not have any discontinuity for λ < 0,
since the denominator in expression (12) will always be positive, assuming that
0 < a(1) < 1.
As noted above, to just-identify the model we can use both the short-run
and long-run restrictions implied by alternative economic models. In particular,
in this section we discuss three different sets of identifying restrictions based
upon: (i) a real business cycle approach, (ii) a rational expectations-monetarist
approach, and (iii) a keynesian approach, respectively.
2.2.1 A real business cycle approach (RBC)
From this theoretical standpoint, real variables, such as the unemployment rate,
are assumed not to be affected by nominal shocks in the short-run. That is eut = εst
and, hence, identification is achieved by setting λ = 0, i.e. the short-run trade-
off is zero. This restiction has been recently used by King and Watson (1994)
as an interpretation of the RBC characteristics. Notice that it does not imply
that the long-run Phillips trade-off is necessarily zero since, as can be seen from
expression (12) that result will only hold if b(1) = 0. Hence, the existente of long-
run Granger-causality from inflation to unemployment in the VAR is crucial for
the existence of a long-run PTOk , in this case.
2.2.2 A monetarist approach (M)
From this viewpoint, we follow the monetarist dictum “inflation is always a
monetary phenomenon in the long-run”. We broadly interpret this dictum as
saying that supply shocks do not affect the long-run level of inflation, i.e.
7 To obtain that expression we solve out (8a) and (8b) for the long-run trends in unemployment
and inflation
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(∂ut+k/∂εst ) = 0 as k tends to infinity8. It is easy to check that this restriction
implies δ = −c(1)/l − a(1), which, together with λ = (ω12 − δω11)/(ω22 − δω12)
obtained from (11), defines a corresponding value for λ.
This identification assumption is similar in spirit to that used in Roberts
(1993) in identifying “core inflation” in the US. King and Watson (1994), in
turn, use a so-called Rational Expectations-Monetarist identification whereby an
implicit value of λ is estimated as cov (u,m)/cov (p,m) where m stands for
unanticipated money (see Barro and Rush 1980). However, since the validity of
the hypothesis that only unanticipated money matters in dubious for the Spanish
economy (see Dolado 1984) we rather prefer the identification restriction chosen
here. Notice that, in this case, the PTO will only be zero if λ = b(1)/1− d (1).
2.2.3 A keynesian approach (K)
The keynesian view is interpreted here as implying that the effect of demand
shocks on short-run (one-quarter) unemployment fluctuations is maximised,
whereas in the long-run both types of shock are allowed to affect unemploy-
ment in a possibly permanent way. This possibility arises by choosing a value
of λ such that it maximises the ratio λ/1− λδ (see the relation between eu and
εd ) subject to the restriction, δ = (ω12 − λω22)/(ω11 − λω12). This procedure
differs from the one chosen by King and Watson (1994) who implicitly define
λ by using the contemporaneous value of ut as an instrument to estimate (1) or
equivalently, estimating (1) by OLS using the reverse regression of πt onto ut
and relevant lags, as performed by Gordon (1970) and other researchers in the
Keynesian tradition. Again, we believe that our identification outline is neater.
2.3 The Lucas-Sargent critique
In this section we just want to point out briefly that the fact that we cannot reject
a unit root in the inflation process over the sample period saves the analysis from
the traditional Lucas-Sargent criticism. The critique runs as follows. Suppose that
unemployment is simply a function of unexpected inflation as in Lucas (1972a,b)
and that this hypothesis is tested in the following expectations-augmented version
of (8a)
ut = λπt − λ∗πet + ηt (13)
where πet = Et−1(πt ), and the natural rate hypothesis implies that λ = λ∗.
8 It could well be possible that a supply shock might lead to a permanent change in the growth
of money and thus on inflation in the long-run if monetary policy endogenously responds to that
type of shock However, in order to preserve the interpretation of the demand shock as a monetary
one, orthogonal to the supply shock, in the bivariate model we exclude this possibility from the
outset Thus, if such an endogenous component of monetary policy exists, the results below should
be interpreted with a dose of caution
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Assume that πt is governed by the process πt = ρ1(L)πt−1 + ρ2(L)ut−1 + εt ,
where, without affecting the basic result, the contemporaneous value of ut has
been excluded. Then, under rational expectations, πet = ρ1(L)πt−1 + ρ2(L)ut−1.
Thus, the reduced for unemployment and inflation relation is given by
ut = λπt − λ∗[ρ1(L)πt−1 + ρ2(L)ut−1] + ηt (14)
so that the long-run trade-off is ∂u/∂π = (λ − λ∗ρ1(1))/(1 + λ∗ρ2(1)). Hence,
even if there is long-run neutrality (λ = λ∗) estimation of (14) would lead to an
apparent long-run trade-off unless ρ1(1) = 1. Naturally, the existence of a unit
root in πt implies precisely that the condition ρ1(1) = 1 holds and, therefore, the
criticism does not apply in our case.
3 Empirical results
3.1 The data set and reduced-form estimates
The data set spans the period 1964:1–1997:4 and consists of: the Spanish CPI
annual inflation rate (πt = ∆4 ln pt ), the Spanish unemployment rate (ut ) the
EU(15) (excluding Spain) CPI annual inflation rate (π∗t = ∆4 ln p∗t ) and the
EU(15) unemployment rate (u∗t )9. All data are quarterly, seasonally unadjusted
and are drawn from the Statistical Bulletin of the Banco de Espan˜a and OECD
Economic Outlook (various issues).
As can be seen in Fig. 1, both Spanish inflation and unemployment rates
moved together up to the late 1970s, reflecting the stagflationary period that
followed the oil price crises. Later, their correlation becomes negative, with the
exception of the 1986–1991 subperiod where seemingly no correlation is present
and the last two years in the sample where a “virtuous process” seems to be
taking place. Nevertheless, as these simple movements are dominated by both
domestic and foreign demand and supply shocks, they are not informative about
their driving forces. To disentangle the source of those correlations and to analyze
the PTOs following a demand shock is the task of the rest of the paper.
Table 1 shows a summary of results from the estimation of the VAR with lag
length ranging from 4 to 8 quarters. The VAR in (∆ut , ∆πt )′, given by Eqs. (8a)
and (8b), was augmented with a constant term, three seasonal dummies, current
and lagged values of ∆u∗t and lagged values of ∆π∗t , accounting for external
shocks leading to shifts in the aggregate demand relations and the Phillips curve.
Both ∆u∗t and ∆π∗t are treated as exogenous, given the small-open economy
assumption supported by the fact that the Spanish variables do not Granger-
cause EU(15) variables. In this respect, two comments are in order. First, the
current value ∆π∗t has been excluded since it turns out to be non-significant
and because including it seems to run directly against the spirit of the RBC
9 We choose the transformation ∆4 ln pt rather than 4∆ ln pt since there is strong evidence that
the stationarity tranformation of the (log of) price level in Spain (and in the EU) is ∆∆4 ln pt See
Espasa and Cancelo (1993)
10
Ta
bl
e
1.
Su
m
m
ar
y
o
fr
ed
uc
ed
-fo
rm
VA
Rs
(19
64
–
19
97
)
∆
u
t
=
a
(L
)∆
u
t−
1
+
b(
L)
∆
π
t−
1
+
e u
t
∆
π
t
=
c
(L
)∆
u
t−
1
+
d(
L)
∆
π
t−
1
+
e π
t
VA
R
la
g
Ch
oi
ce
o
fl
ag
le
ng
th
Su
m
o
ft
he
Co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
R
es
id
ua
lC
ov
ar
ia
nc
e
M
at
rix
Te
st
s
o
n
R
es
id
ua
ls
le
ng
ht
Cr
ite
ria
A
IC
SB
IC
a(1
)
b(1
)
c(1
)
d(1
)
sd
(e u
)
sd
(e π
)
co
rr
(.)
LB
(8)
A
RC
H
(4)
4
3.
62
3
−1
.3
48
0.
67
0.
01
−0
.4
2
−0
.0
9
0.
29
0.
98
−0
.0
41
0.
40
13
.3
1.
33
3.
55
(0.
10
)
(0.
04
)
(0.
24
)
(0.
14
)
(0.
49
)
(0.
11
)
(0.
86
)
(0.
47
)
5
3.
61
9
−1
.2
54
0.
62
0.
01
−0
.2
5
0.
13
6
0.
30
1.
03
−0
.0
49
1.
03
12
.4
1.
32
3.
46
(0.
11
)
(0.
05
)
(0.
15
)
(0.
16
)
(0.
85
)
(0.
15
)
(0.
87
)
(0.
43
)
6
3.
65
3
−1
.1
19
0.
59
−0
.0
01
−0
.2
9
0.
14
0.
30
1.
05
−0
.0
55
1.
01
12
.6
1.
03
3.
35
(0.
11
)
(0.
05
)
(0.
17
)
(0.
19
)
(0.
84
)
(0.
14
)
(0.
80
)
(0.
40
)
7
3.
71
0
−0
.9
63
0.
57
0.
00
2
−0
.3
4
0.
01
2
0.
30
1.
05
−0
.0
55
2.
06
12
.4
1.
16
3.
33
(0.
11
)
(0.
06
)
(0.
19
)
(0.
20
)
(0.
75
)
(0.
15
)
(0.
82
)
(0.
39
)
8
3.
76
1
−0
.8
10
0.
53
0.
00
3
−0
.4
2
−0
.1
5
0.
31
1.
05
−0
.0
58
2.
04
11
.4
1.
36
3.
35
(0.
12
)
(0.
07
)
(0.
21
)
(0.
23
)
(0.
75
)
(0.
18
)
(0.
87
)
(0.
40
)
No
te
Fo
r
th
e
su
m
o
f
th
e
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s
es
tim
at
es
,s
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
sis
.A
IC
=
A
ka
ik
e
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Cr
ite
rio
n
an
d
SB
IC
=
Sc
hw
ar
z
B
ay
es
ia
n
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
Cr
ite
rio
n.
LB
(8)
=
Lju
ng
+
B
ox
te
st
fo
rc
o
rr
el
at
io
n
u
p
to
8t
h
o
rd
er
.A
RC
H
(4)
=
En
gl
e
X
te
st
fo
rA
RC
H
ef
fe
ct
su
p
to
4t
h-
or
de
r;
p-
v
al
ue
sf
or
th
os
e
te
st
s
ar
e
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s(
the
fir
st
co
lu
m
n
co
rr
es
po
nd
st
o
th
e
re
sid
ua
ls
o
ft
he
in
fla
tio
n
eq
ua
tio
n).
Th
e
es
tim
at
es
ar
e
o
bt
ai
ne
d
fro
m
a
VA
R
in
cl
ud
in
g
a
co
n
st
an
t,
se
as
o
n
al
du
m
m
ie
s
an
d
th
e
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
es
o
ft
he
EU
u
n
em
pl
oy
m
en
tr
at
e
an
d
th
e
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nt
es
an
d
la
gg
ed
fir
st
di
ffe
re
nc
es
o
ft
he
EU
in
fla
tio
n
ra
te
.
11
identification strategy whereby no demand shocks, either domestic or foreign,
should affect unemployment in the short-run. Secondly, reparameterizing the
long-run solution of the VAR in terms of inflation and unemployment differentials
cannot be rejected at standard confidence levels. Thus, in this sense the structural
shocks εdt and εst can be loosely interpreted as idiosyncratic national supply
and demand shocks though, for the sake of brevity, we will stick to the labels
in Sect. 2. And third, the foreign variables have also been introduced to help
explaining a possible structural break in the late seventies. In this respect, we
also introduced some oil-price series and some (foreign) labour-market variables
(such as replacement ratios) directly, but they did not prove to be significant
once the foreign variables are included.
It should also be noticed that there are no signs of cointegration among
any of the series and, thus, that the specification of the VAR in first-differences
seems appropriate10. Furthermore, according to various portmanteau test on serial
correlation and tests on ARCH in the error terms, reported in Table 1, there is
no sign of misspecification in the VAR. As for the choice of the VAR lag length,
both AIC and SBIC criteria point out to 5 and 4 lags, respectively. Nevertheless,
results for lag length ranging from 4 to 8 are also reported in Table 1 to highlight
their robustness for such a choice.
Various implications follow from the above results. First, the correlation be-
tween the VAR innovations (eu and eπ) is small, implying that λ ∼= −δω11/ω22.
Secondly, the estimates of b(1) and d (1) are found to be small and non signifi-
cant; that b(1) is non significant implies that there is no Granger-causality from
inflation to unemployment (given foreign inflation and foreign unemployment).
Thirdly, the estimates of a(1) and c(1) are more sizeable and significant, albeit
the second is marginally so; that c(1) is significant and negative implies that
there is Granger-causality from unemployment to inflation. And finally, since
0 < a(1) < 1 and c(1) < 0, it follows from expression (12) in Sect. 2 that the
long-run PTO is a monotonic function for negative values of λ. Figure 2 depicts
the estimated long-run trade-offs as a function of λ for the various lag lengths
reported in Table 1. It can be observed that, for small values of λ, the PTO is
almost nil whilst, for high values, it is around −2.0. The choice of lag length, in
turn, does not seem to have any noticeable effect on these estimates.
3.2 Impulse response functions and variance decompositions
Let us now turn to the results under the different identification schemes. We
begin the discussion with the keynesian (K) identifying restrictions. Using the
procedure described in Sect. 2.2.3, λ = −0.25 proved to maximise the short-run
demand effects on unemployment under K while the corresponding values of δ is
2.8. Figure 3a depicts the impulse-response (IR) functions of unemployment and
10 Conditioning on ∆u∗t , and ∆π∗t−1, Johansen’s maximum eigenvalue test for cointegration be-
tween ut and πt yields 9 33 (for r = 0) and 5 36 (for r = 1) where r is the cointegration rank The
critical values are 14 90 and 8 18, respectively
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Fig. 2. Implied long-run Phillips trade-offs
inflation to a unit demand shock whereas the bottom panel depicts the Phillips
trade-off for various horizons; the short-run trade-off is −0.3 whilst the long-run
trade-off, which is achieved after four years, is −0.6.
As regards the M identifying restriction, λ = −0.12 turned out to be the value
obtained from the procedure described in Sect. 2.2.2, yielding δ = 1.21. Figure 3b
shows the same information as above. Since inflation is a monetary phenomenon
in the long-run under this scheme, its IR function converges quickly towards
unity, whereas unemployment falls by 0.3 percentage points in the long-run. The
PTO is −0.12 in the short run and, after two years, reaches a steady state value
of −0.3. Both trade-offs are smaller (in absolute value) than under the K scheme,
but they turn out to be statistically different from zero.
Next, we turn to the RBC scheme where λ = 0 and so δ = −0.14. Since
b(1) = d (1) ∼= 0, the RBC implies a vertical long-run Phillips curve. Figure 3c
shows a similar IR function for inflation to the one obtained under the M scheme.
Naturally, what differs is the shape of the unemployment IR function which,
under the RBC assumption, implies an almost zero trade-off at all horizons.
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Fig. 3a. Unemployment and inflation responses in Keynesian model (Responses to a unit demand
shock)
Table 2 summarises the importance of demand shocks in explaining the vari-
ability of forecast errors of inflation and unemployment at various horizons, by
means of the forecast error-variance decomposition (VD) method. Under the K
scheme, demand shocks explain 100% of unemployment variability, reflecting
that inflation does not Granger-cause unemployment, and only 12% of inflation
14
Fig. 3b. Monetarist model (responses to a unit demand shock)
variability (the remaining proportions are explained by supply shocks). As ex-
pected, under the M scheme, εdt explains 15% of the unemployment variability
and almost 90% of inflation variability. Finally, under the RBC scheme, unem-
ployment variability is completely explained by εst , whereas 93% of inflation
variability is explained in the short-run and almost 60% in the long-run by those
shocks.
15
Fig. 3c. RBC model (responses to a unit demand shock)
3.3 Sacrifice ratios
Once we have examined the different trade-offs implied by the various identi-
fication outlines, we turn to an alternative measure of the cost of disinflation.
Table 3 shows the estimated dynamic responses of the levels of unemployment
16
Table 2. The role of demand shocks in variance decompositions (1964–1997)
Horizon (λ = −0, 25) (λ = −0, 12) (λ = 0)
Keynesian model Monetarist model RBC model
u π u π u π
1 100.00 11.00 15.32 89.98 0.000 93.03
4 99.7 11.78 13.69 87.93 0.004 57 59
8 98.9 12.13 13.93 88.36 0.003 57.75
12 98.8 12.17 13.94 88.50 0.003 57.66
16 98.8 12.17 13.94 88.53 0.004 57.65
∞ 98.8 12.17 13.94 88.53 0.003 57.64
Note The figures represent percentage points.
Table 3. Sacrifice ratios (SR) for A 1 percentage point permanent reduction in inflation rate (Full
Sample: 1964–1997)
Horizon Keynesian model
u π SR
1 0.22 −0.85 0.22
4 0.35 −1.35 0.35
8 0.49 −0.90 0.84
12 0.54 −1.03 1.38
16 0.57 −1.01 1.95
∞ 0.59 −1.00 2.54
Horizon Monetarist model
u π SR
1 0.11 −0.96 0.11
4 0.18 −1.31 0.18
8 0.25 −0.88 0.43
12 0.28 −1.03 0.71
16 0.29 −0.98 1.00
∞ 0.30 −1.00 1.30
Horizon RBC model
u π SR
1 −0.22 −1.10 −0.02
4 −0.03 −0.98 −0.03
8 −0.03 −1.01 −0.06
12 −0.03 −0.99 −0.09
16 −0.03 −1.00 −0.12
∞ −0.03 −1.00 −0.15
and inflation to an εdt shock that eventually leads to a 1% permanent reduction in
inflation. In addition, the table shows the sacrifice ratio defined as the sum over
a number of years of the incremental annual levels of unemployment following
the demand shock; i.e, the sum over the period of the differences in the annual
levels of unemployment with and without the demand shock11. Under a stable
11 Formally, the sacrifice ratio is defined as: ao
SR = lim
k→∞
∑∞
k=0 PTOk
∂πt+k = −1
.
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Okun’s law, these sacrifice rates would be proportional to the cumulated loss in
output over the relevant horizon.
The K identification suggests that the unemployment rate raises by 0.35%
after one year, is 0.5% higher after two years, and around 0.6% higher after
five years. By contrast, the M identification yields smaller unemployment re-
sponses: 0.18% after a year and 0.30% after the five years. Finally, under the
RBC identification, unemployment is governed essentially by supply shocks, so
that the reduction in inflation has negligible costs in terms of unemployment at
all horizons.
The resulting sacrifice ratios over five years are, respectively, 2.5%, 1.3%
or 0%. Following the results obtained by Dolado and Lo´pez-Salido (1996), the
Okun’s coefficient for the Spanish economy is around 2 over the sample 1970–
1994. Consequently, the cumulated loss in output over the five-year horizon could
be estimated to be 5%, 2.5% or 0%, depending on the specific identification
outline.
4 Subsample stability and two disinflationary periods
In this section we investigate the stability of the bivariate relation analyzed above.
We began this paper by pinpointing that the late 1970s represented key years in
the recent history of Spanish inflation. Thus, it seems natural to test whether
that period is the natural breaking date in the sample. However, to take an
“open-minded” approach on this issue, stability was tested with unknown break
point tests, such as the sup-Wald statistic of Andrews (1993) with truncation
fractions (0.15, 0.85). Using that test, we find 1979:1 as the breaking date in
both equations, with p-values of around 0.04 in both cases. Moreover, the long-
run PTO was marginally insignificant, for all the identification outlines, during the
first subsample, suggesting that such a period was dominated by supply shocks.
However, when the VAR was re-estimated in the sample 1979:2–1997:4, the
results were very similar to those obtained for the whole sample, as shown in
Fig. 4 which compares the PTOs (across different values of λ) for the complete
sample and the chosen subsample. As regards the VD analysis, which is skipped
for the sake of brevity, the results were again similar to those shown in Table 2.
Finally, with regard to the sacrifice ratios, the results were almost identical for
the RBC and M outlines, while the one implied by the K identification was only
half of a percentage point lower in the subsample.
So far we have discussed the three alternative identification schemes on equal
grounds. After all, their reduced forms are identical. Are there any grounds to
choosing a particular one on the basis of extraneous information to the model12?
In this respect, we use prior information on three recent disinflationary periods
to evaluate the identification schemes. The first one goes from 1987:1 to 1988:1
12 Since the system is just-identified, it is not possible to test it in a formal way Thus, the only
validity checking we can do is by using “common sense” and confronting the results with the
observations and one’s knowledge of economics (Leeper et al 1996)
18
Fig. 4. Comparing long-run Phillips trade-offs (estimates from a VAR 4)
and was dominated by tighter monetary policy with interest rates raising by 5
p.p. in a single year. The second one runs from 1989:3 to 1991:3 and, while
interest rates remained high and stable around 15%, it was accompanied by tight
credit restrictions. So, both disinflationary periods seem to follow a monetary
contraction (see Escriva´ and Santos 1991). Conversely, the available evidence
about the third disinflationary period, which covers 1992:1 to 1993:1, points out
to the effects of deregulation in labour and goods markets as the major causes
behind the fall in inflation (see Dolado and Jimeno, 1997). Accordingly, we
expect the first two periods to be dominated by demand shocks, whilst the last
one should be explained by supply shocks.
Using the VD results for the above-mentioned episodes we found that ac-
cording to the M scheme the contribution of demand shocks to the variance of
∆π during the first two subperiods was above 90%, while in the third episode
it was only 20%. The K outline, in turn, explains that more than 70% of the
variability is due to demand shocks in all three episodes, whereas according to
the RBC scheme, it is always below 5%. Thus, according to our prior beliefs on
the distribution of shocks in each period, our hunch is that of the three cases con-
sidered above, the monetarist one is closest to the real workings of the Spanish
economy.
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Fig. 5. Long-run Phillips trade-offs as a function of lambda (results from a VAR 4)
Finally, in order to check the robustness of our results, we report in Fig. 5,
for a wide range of values for λ, the resulting point estimates and confidence
intervals for the long-run PTO, showing what values of λ are compatible with the
hypothesis of a vertical long-run Phillips curve. For λ < −1.27, the estimated
long-run PTO are large, though non significant. However, for −1.27λ < −0.09,
a range which includes two of the three previous outlines, the hypothesis is
rejected, unless prior beliefs close to the RBC outline are assumed. Thus, the
evidence points out that even under the M scheme (λ = −0.12) the rise in unem-
ployment/output loss, due to a disinflation led by negative demand shocks, seems
to be permanent, a result which is line with the strong available evidence point-
ing out that the staggering rise in Spanish unemployment has a strong hysteresis
component (see, e.g., Blanchard and Jimeno 1995).
5 Robustness of the results to a trivariate VAR
So far, we have relied upon the assumption that there are only two important
shocks which can be identified from the bivariate VAR in Eqs. (1)–(2). A con-
troversial implication of our results is that there seems to be a permanent PTO
even under the sensible monetarist assumption that inflation is a purely monetary
phenomenon in the long-run. Therefore, it is important to explore whether this
result is robust or not to changes in the specification of the model.
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As pointed out by Evans (1994), let us suppose that there is a third shock
in the system; then the identified supply and demand shocks from the bivariate
VAR will be a linear combination of the three shocks. In particular, what this
model identifies as a demand shock may not necessarily be a (nominal) mone-
tary shock but a mixture of the latter and possibly a fiscal shock. After all, the
underlying theory behind Eq. (2) is that of an aggregate demand equation where
output depends on real money balances, government expenditure and taxes. For
simplicity, the last two variables were ignored in our earlier discussion. Yet, they
could be important. Hence, in our bivariate framework we are just able to iden-
tify pooled demand shocks. Thus, to disentangle a pure “monetary” shock, one
possibility is to add a third variable (xt ) to the VAR which contains direct infor-
mation about the “monetary” shocks so that εdt can be interpreted appropriately.
Empirically, this is done by adding lagged values of xt to the VAR in (8a)–(8b),
while allowing xt to be influenced by contemporaneous values of ∆ut and ∆πt
in its own equation (i.e., the original demand and supply shocks are treated as
Wold causally prior to the third shock). The intuition behind this approach is as
follows: it is assumed that an indicator of the monetary policy stance is affected
both by unemployment and inflation contemporaneously, as if the monetary au-
thorities were able to identify shocks in those variables within the current quarter,
whereas the effects of the monetary innovations on the other two variables take at
least one quarter to take place, in line with the traditional monetary transmission
mechanism (see, for instance, Christiano et al. 1995). Thus, the innovations to
xt are directly interpreted as “monetary” shocks.
We considered various candidates for xt and found the level of the intervention
rate of the Bank of Spain as a suitable one13. Figure 6 depicts the IR functions
of unemployment and inflation to a rise of one standard deviation in the short
term interest rate. They show that the interest rate shock is rather persistent
while the unemployment rises and the inflation rate falls. In Table 4 we report
the corresponding sacrifice ratio, that is a cumulative permanent increase of the
unemployment rate of about 0.6 p.p. per 1 p.p. of inflation reduction. Notice
that, though at the margin, the hypothesis that there is a permanent PTO is not
rejected at 10% significance level.
The new results arising from attempting to distinguish between monetary
and non-monetary shocks yield different implications regarding the size of the
sacrifice ratio, which is now halved and they yield an interesting benchmark when
comparing the costs and benefits of achieving price stability, the latter being
defined as an inflation rate of about 1.5 p.p., once the inflation measurement bias
is taken into account. In particular, as claimed by Feldstein (1999), if the benefits
of lower inflation, measured in terms of GDP gains, are permanent, via lower
distortions stemming from the interaction of inflation and taxes, then, discounting
an annual benefit of x percent of GDP at a discount rate of ρ in an economy
that has a normal growth rate of 2.5% a year (the Spanish normal rate over the
13 Other alternative variables such as the first-differenced growth rates of M2, M3 and ALP2 or
the first-differenced short-term interest rates (in particular, the interbank one-month rate), were used
with less clear results
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Fig. 6. Responses to an interest rate shock Monetarist identification with interset rates in the VAR
Table 4. Sacrifice ratios for a 1 p p permanent reduction in inflation rate (trivariate model including
short-run interest rates) (1982–1997)
Horizon u SR
4 0 04 0 04
8 0 16 0 20
12 0 13 0 33
16 0 13 0 46
∞ 0 13 0 59
(0 11 1 15)
Note: Bootstrap 90% confidence interval in parenthesis
sample period), yields a present value of x/(ρ− 0.025). If the costs in terms of
output are permanent as it seems to be the case, then disinflation of 1 p.p. will
be a worthy enterprise if x > c, where c is the annual loss of GDP. According
to the monetarist model, using an Okun’s coefficient of 2.0 (see Dolado and
Lo´pez-Salido 1996), the threshold value in the first case of GDP is 0.24% of
GDP per year (obtained, following Table 4, as 2 times 0.6, divided by 5, since
the sacrifice ratio is computed every 5 years). Dolado et al. (1999) estimate that
the permanent benefits are about 0.7% of GDP per year and, hence, conclude
that achieving price stability seems a worthy enterprise.
Finally, we would like to comment briefly on how our results, based upon
the SVAR methodology, compare to the more traditional ones obtained under
the estimation of a simultaneous equations model. In this respect, Andre´s et al.
22
(1996) make use of a small quarterly macroeconometric model to compute the
sacrifice ratio of permanently reducing inflation in Spain by 1 p.p. They conclude
that these costs are about 0.45% of GDP per year on a permanent basis, which
is slightly higher than what we find here. Equally, Ball (1996) suggests that a
permanent reduction in inflation of 1 p.p. comes with a permanent annual output
loss of about 0.55% of GDP, a figure again slightly higher than 0.24% estimated
for the monetarist case in the trivariate VAR. Finally, Bullard and Keating (1995)
find that, for Spain, permanent inflation (nominal) shocks have no statistically
significant effect on GDP in the long-run, but their study excludes the recession
in the early nineties.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the joint dynamic behaviour of inflation and
unemployment in the Spanish economy over the period 1964-1997, with the aim
of documenting the existing trade-offs between both variables at high and low
frequencies, and over several subperiods. We proceed in the style of King and
Watson (1994), who used structural VAR techniques to undertake an identification
of the Phillips curve System. We have used, in particular, three identification
schemes which fit the data equally well, but that have different implications for
the magnitude of Phillips trade-offs and for sacrifice ratios. A key assumption in
our analysis is that both unemployment and inflation can be described as first-
order integrated processes – I(l)- for the sample period, therefore avoiding the
Lucas-Sargent critique about the econometric estimation of “spurious” trade-offs
(Lucas and Sargent 1979).
As regards the different identification outlines, the following results stand
out. A traditional keynesian scheme yields: (i) a large estimated long-run trade-
off between inflation and unemployment of around −0.6; (ii) the short-run (one
year) and long-run variability of unemployment is almost completely explained
by demand shocks which, in turn, only explain 12% of the variability of inflation
at all frequencies; and (iii) the sacrifice ratio over five years is estimated to be
a cumulative rise of 2.5 p.p. in unemployment for a permanent disinflation of
1 p.p. By contrast, a monetarist interpretation yields: (i) a long-run trade-off
of −0.3, half of that estimated under the keynesian scheme; (ii) demand shocks
explain almost 90% of inflation variability and 15% of unemployment variability;
and (iii) a sacrifice ratio of about 1.3. Finally, an alternative real business-cycle
outline yields: (i) negligible trade-off; (ii) unemployment variability is almost
fully explained by supply shocks whereas 90% of inflation variability in the short-
run, and 60% in the long-run, is due to demand shocks; and (iii) a negligible
sacrifice ratio.
With regard to the analysis of different subsamples, we find that the results for
the total sample are seemingly dominated by the behaviour during the 1979-1997
subsample, whereas the shifts in the Phillips curve before the end of the 1970s
were dominated by supply shocks. Next, on the basis of extraneous information,
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we analyze the contribution of demand and supply shocks to the variability of
inflation and unemployment over significant episodes in the recent disinflationary
period in Spain, finding that the monetarist scheme fits better with prior beliefs.
Finally, several robustness exercises have been undertaken. In particular, aug-
menting the bivariate VAR with a third variable (a short-term interest rate), in
order to disentangle monetary from “non-monetary” shocks, indicates that the
unemployment-inflation trade-off remains permanent though about one-half of
what is estimated in the bivariate VAR, in agreement with the high degree of
hysteresis in the Spanish labor market. Nonetheless, the benefits stemming from
lower inflation, needed to overcome the estimated costs, are higher in both cases.
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